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A further question may be asked as to the effect of the California Con-
stitution's prohibition of lotteries 53 upon the court's ability to give relief
which amounts to an enforcement of the prohibited arrangement. Again
lacking precedent and authority, analogy and extension can only carry us
so far and this question would appear to be outside the area of reasonable
association.
It would appear that in the final analysis, the answer to the question of
whether a contract arising from one of the questionable schemes enu-
merated will be enforced or not lies in the abyss of public policy. A relaxa-
tion of the rules or a tightening thereof will reflect a judicial attempt to
accomplish public desires and necessities. At one extreme is the absolute
denial of efficacy to such a contract on the basis that it is illegal and at the
other the free enforcement on public policy grounds, or rather that such
an enforcement will not be violative of any public policy, which is in effect
the same thing.
Jimmie Murad*
-3 "'The legislature shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises for
any purpose and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale in this State of lottery or gift enter-
prise tickets or tickets in any scheme in the nature of a lottery .. " CAL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 26.
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RESCISSION: Non-Wilful Misrepresentation;
Unilateral and Mutual Mistake; Mistake of Law and Fact
Rescission, as a contract remedy, is ".... the annulling or abrogation or
unmaking of a contract and the placing of the parties to it in statu quo."'
Professor Corbin states that true rescission is a mutual agreement of the
parties to discharge and terminate duties under a presently existing con-
tract; however, he recognizes the widespread usage of the term when an
unilateral dissolution is meant, and defines this unilateral rescission as a
".. . declaration of freedom by an injured party for a breach by the other
party."2 It is this unilateral rescission with which this article is concerned; that
is, rescission as a legal right to relief based on consent improperly derived.
The affirmative defense or remedy of unilateral rescission is based on
theories of equity and justice, and is therefore somewhat subject to the
vagaries of language of different courts guided by different legislation on
the subject. But the same thesis is apparent in most cases, i.e., that one
should not be bound by a contract which is in some way imperfect when
such imperfection is not attributable to him. This is the right of "... voiding
the voidable contract" of which Bishop speaks.
3
Procedural Requirements
When a party to a contract desires to rescind, he must act promptly
upon discovery of the facts which entitle him to rescission.4 This require-
1 Sessions v. Meadows, 13 Cal. App. 2d 748, 751, 57 P.2d 548, 549 (1936).
2 5 CoaBN, CONTRACTS § 1167, at 727 (1951).
- Bisnop, CONTRACTS § 679, at 265 (1887).
4 Schneider v. Henley, 61 Cal. App. 758, 215 Pac. 1036 (1923); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1691.
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ment of prompt action has not, however, been inflexibly applied, and where
delay has not resulted in prejudice to the other party, rescission has been
granted."
Before a party is entitled to unilaterally rescind a contract, he must also
restore, or tender restoration, to the other party all that he received under
the contract.6 Of course, where the contract is wholly executory, there is
nothing to restore and such offer is not required.
7
In most states there is a difference in the procedural requirements of
tender or restoration of the benefits received under a contract, depending
upon whether rescission in equity or in law is sought." In equity, the general
rule is that an offer or tender of restoration is not a condition precedent to
suit.9 However, in California the rule seems to be that an offer of restora-
tion is necessary before action either in law or equity.10 However, certain
wide exceptions have developed to the rule where what would be a proceed-
ing in equity is involved; so in fact, the practice tends, even in California,
toward the majority view, requiring restoration as a condition precedent
to rescission at law, but not in equity."
The principles upon which the right to rescission rests are primarily
equitable; therefore the right rests only with the party who is himself with-
out fault.'
The basic authority for rescission is found in California Civil Code sec-
tion 1689, which provides that a party to a contract may rescind if consent
to the contract was given by mistake or obtained through duress, menace,
fraud or undue influence.'
3
The primary concern of this note is with those cases where rescission
is sought under this section of the Civil Code. The concentration will be
only upon cases where the consent was derived without any intended mis-
5 Lombardi v. Sinanides, 71 Cal. App. 272, 235 Pac. 455 (1925); Stone v. McCarty,
64 Cal. App. 158, 220 Pac. 690 (1923).
6 Kent v. Clark, 20 Cal. 2d 779, 128 P.2d 868 (1942); Morrison v. Lods, 39 Cal. 381
(1870); Weger v. Rocha, 138 Cal. App. 109, 32 P.2d 417 (1934); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1691; But see Carruth v. Fritch, 36 Cal. 2d 426, 224 P.2d 702, 24 A.L.R.2d 1403
(1951).
7 Esau v. Briggs, 89 Cal. App. 2d 427, 201 P.2d 25 (1949).
8 At law, see e.g., cases collected Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1003 (1936); 12 Am. JuR. Con-
tracts § 451 (1938).
9 Nelson v. Carlson, 54 Minn. 90, 55 N.W. 821 (1893); Custer v. Shackelford, 225
S.W. 450 (Mo. 1920); BrAck, REscissioN Aim CANCELLATION 1514, n. 146 (2d ed. 1929).
10 See McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527, 36 P.2d 642, 95 A.L.R. 1019 (1934);
Kelley v. Owens, 120 Cal. 502, 47 Pac. 369 (1897).
11 See McNeese v. McNeese, 190 Cal. 402, 213 Pac. 36 (1923); Auclair v. Auclair, 72
Cal. App. 2d 791, 165 P.2d 527 (1946); RESTATEMENT, REsTrTrTON CAL. ANNOT. § 65,
comment d (1937).
"2Nelson v. Spence, 182 Cal. App. 2d -, 6 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1960); Joshua Tree
Townsite Co. v. Joshua Tree Land Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 590, 224 P.2d 85 (1950). For
further discussion of the procedural aspects of rescission, see Comments, 36 CALMT. L.
REv. 606 (1948); 21 CALn. L. REv. 130 (1933); 19 CALiF. L. REv. 424 (1931).
13 Besides allowing rescission by consent of all the parties as provided in CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 1697 and 1699, and for the reasons listed in CAL. Civ. CODE § 1689, including
failure of consideration, the Civil Code also provides for rescission when the contract is
unlawful or against public policy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3406.
NOTES
statement by the other party, i.e., where there was no guilty knowledge.
Thus are eliminated from consideration the grounds of duress, menace, and
the cases involving wilful misrepresentation or fraud.
Non-Wilful Representation
With the exclusion of all the cases involving "wilfulness," it might seem
that the only remaining grounds for rescission under Civil Code section 1689
would be mistake. But the California courts, even though this element of
guilty knowledge is removed, have rescinded many contracts on the theory
of a consent grounded even on a non-wilful misrepresentation, or a type
of fraud.
1 4
Actual and Constructive Fraud
California Civil Code section 1572 provides that any positive assertion
in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it,
which is in fact not true even though the speaker believed it to be true, is
actual fraud. Thus it appears that when a representation is recklessly made,
or made without reasonable grounds for believing its truth, the person mak-
ing such representation is guilty of actual fraud. Where such a representa-
tion is made, the only intent needed is an intent to induce a party to enter
into a contract, and rescission is not restricted to those cases where there
is an actual intent to deceive.15
If the statements made were warranted, then the relationship between
the parties is important. Civil Code section 1573 provides that ". . . any
breach of duty without an actually fraudulent intent, which gains an ad-
vantage to the person in fault . . . by misleading another to his prejudice,
is constructive fraud." Therefore, it is possible for a party to make a state-
ment which, in view of all the facts known to the speaker, is warranted,
but which, because of the relationship existing between the parties, may
amount to constructive fraud, when the statement is not in fact true.
This theory has been successfully used in cases involving brokers, spouses,
the physically weak or intoxicated, or in other cases when there has been
some relationship of trust or confidence giving rise to some legal duty which
was breached, resulting in damage to another, but which fell short of
actual fraud.' 6
"Innocent" Misrepresentation
But if the representation was warranted and there is not the specified
relationship between the parties, the statute goes no further. But at least
a few California cases have allowed rescission, somewhat on the basis of
what Restatement of Contracts section 476 terms an "innocent misrepre-
14 Spreckles v. Corrill, 152 Cal. 383, 92 Pac. 1011 (1907).
15 J. C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distilleries Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Calif. 1954); Pohl v. Mills, 218 Cal. 641, 24 P.2d 476 (1933); Spreckles v. Gorrill, 152
Cal. 383, 92 Pac. 1011 (1907); Howe v. Deck, 46 Cal. App. 2d 569, 116 P.2d 155
(1941).
16 See Fowler v. Brown, 125 Cal. App. 2d 450, 270 P.2d 559 (1954); In re Ar-
buckle's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 562, 220 P.2d 950, 23 A.L.R.2d 372 (1950). Applied to
brokers: Darrow v. Robert A. Klein & Co., 111 Cal. App. 310, 295 Pac. 566 (1931); to
spouses: Holmes v. Holmes, 98 Cal. App. 2d 536, 220 P.2d 603 (1950); to the physically
weak: Carty v. Connolly, 91 Cal. 15, 27 Pac. 599 (1891); to the intoxicated: Deasy v.
Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 235, 178 Pac. 538 (1919).
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sentation." Usually in cases such as Scott v. Delta Land & Water Co.,'
17
where there was an innocent misrepresentation of the productivity of the
land sold, this has been done to prevent the necessity of categorizing the
specific ground upon which rescission was granted.18 In Scott, the court
said, ".. . [Iln an action ... [for rescission] the good faith of the party who
procures the assent of another to the making of a contract by material mis-
representations is of no moment.""
The requirement that the party attempting to rescind must have actually
relied upon the misrepresentation is common to all these cases where re-
scission was granted because of consent gained by a misrepresentation,20
but the requirement is often blended into the element of materiality, which
will be referred to later.
Misrepresentation of Law and Fact
In these classifications, there has been no emphasis on differences be-
tween misrepresentations of law and of fact. The rule has been in California,
that a misrepresentation of law is not actionable unless there has been some
relation of trust or confidence between the parties.21 However, the defini-
tion of this relationship has been liberally construed to include relationships
which were legal, social, moral, domestic or merely personal.21 It is inter-
esting to note that if this wide definition of a confidential relationship were
extended in the application of the theory of constructive fraud, almost any
case which today might be termed a purely innocent misrepresentation
might then be rescinded as a contructive fraud.
Mistake
Mistake is the other broad basis of rescission when the matter of im-
properly derived consent is involved. California Civil Code section 1577
defines mistake of fact as one which involves no breach of duty and which
consists of an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact, material to
the contract, or a belief in the present existence of a thing material to the
contract which does not, or has not, existed.
Mutual Mistake of Fact
To serve as a theory upon which rescission will be granted, such a mis-
take must be mutual in the majority of American jurisdictions. 3 Even in
California most of the cases of rescission on the grounds of mistake, are
decided on the theory of mutual mistake.24 These cases are mainly of two
17 57 Cal. App. 320, 207 Pac. 389 (1922).
1s See Giovanni v. Bartmann, 59 Cal. App. 651, 211 Pac. 844 (1923) (dictum);
Bradley v. Delta Land & Water Co., 57 Cal. App. 790, 207 Pac. 395 (1922); Scott v.
Delta Land & Water Co., supra note 17.
19 Supra note 17, at 328, 207 Pac. at 392, where facts excluded other theories.
20 See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1568.
2 1Haviland v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 172 Cal. 601, 158 Pac. 328 (1916);
Champion v. Woods, 79 Cal. 17, 21 Pac. 534 (1889).
22 See, e.g., Bank of America v. Sanchez, 3 Cal. App. 2d 238, 38 P.2d 787 (1930).
2 3 E.g., McMillon v. Flagstaff, 18 Ariz. 536, 164 Pac. 318 (1917); RESTATEMNT,
CoNTRacrs § 503 (1932); 12 Am. JiR. Contracts § 133 (1939); 19 Am. Jur. Equity
§ 57 (1939).
24 E.g., Van Meter v. Bent Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 588, 297 P.2d 644 (1956); Gold-
ner v. Jaffe, 171 Cal. App. 2d 751, 341 P.2d 354 (1959).
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types: 1. where there has been a misrepresentation which induces the con-
tract, or 2. where the mistake is related to the intrinsic nature of the bargain,
but was not the result of a misrepresentation.
Where a Misrepresentation Induces Contract
In the first category, one of the leading cases is Johnson v. Withers.2"
In that case the seller's misrepresentation regarding the minerals to be
found on the land was based on an expert's report, also mistaken. Rescission
was allowed on the theory of mutual mistake even though the court said
the misrepresentation was the chief inducement of the contract. In Mosher
v. Lack,"' an innocent misrepresentation as to the amount of acreage in a
piece of land was made by the seller; rescission was again granted on the
basis of mutual mistake. In Lombardi v. Sinanides,27 where vendor of land
innocently misrepresented the boundary, rescission was also granted for
mutual mistake, although in this case the Civil Code section 1572 definition
of actual fraud was also considered.
Where Mistake Related to Nature of Bargain
In the second category are found the more traditional cases of mutual
mistake where the mistake is related to the intrinsic nature of the bargain.
California follows the general rule in this category which is illustrated by
such cases as In re Barton's Estate,28 where an agreement for compensation
was rescinded because of a mutual mistake of both trustees and beneficiary
as to computation of the trustee's remuneration.
Unilateral Mistake of Fact
The majority of cases rescinded in California on the grounds of mistake
are such cases of mutual mistake. But neither Civil Code section 1572 nor
section 1689, the governing statutes, expressly require mutuality. Conse-
quently, there are many cases in California which allow rescission for an
unilateral mistake of fact,29 contrary to the general rule which requires
mutuality. The theory has been used most often in cases where to hold the
parties to the contract would result in great hardship to the mistaken one,
or where there is any element of unfairness, but the mistake was not mutual.
One famous California case which allowed rescission for unilateral mis-
take is Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n v. De Jarnett.30 The rules of the
cemetery limited ownership of the plots to Caucasians. The contract which
the defendant, a Negro, signed also contained the restrictive clause, but
the court allowed rescission by the cemetery on the basis of an unilateral
mistake of fact. In Moore v. Copp,31 rescission was allowed of a contract
of sale which the defendant set up to prevent the plaintiff from quieting
her title. Here the age discrepancy and the hardship on the plaintiff had
the contract been enforced, combined with her unilateral mistake as to
259 Cal. App. 52, 98 Pac. 42 (1908).
2640 Cal. App. 574, 181 Pac. 815 (1919).
2771 Cal. App. 272, 235 Pac. 455 (1925).
2896 Cal. App. 2d 234, 214 P.2d 857 (1950).
29 E.g., Brunzell Constr. Co. v. G. J. Weisbrod, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 278, 285 P.2d
989 (1955).
30 79 Cal App. 601, 250 Pac. 581 (1926).
31 119 Cal. 429, 51 Pac. 630 (1897) (dictum).
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some of the surrounding facts, allowed her to obtain rescission. In that
case the Supreme Court stated, M... mt is not necessary that a mistake of
fact be mutual."
3 2
Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles33 is another case where re-
scission was allowed for unilateral mistake. Kemper sued to cancel a bid
it had submitted on a public construction project and to obtain a discharge
of its bid bond. In submitting its bid, plaintiff mistakenly omitted an item
amounting to $301,769, through a computational error. Plaintiff discovered
its error within hours of the opening of the bids and asked rescission, but
the defendant resolved to accept the bid. (An ordinance prevented the
sealed bids being withdrawn and gave the city three months in which to
accept).
Rescission was allowed, but the court stressed the fact that though the
mistake was unilateral, it would be unconscionable to allow the city to take
advantage of the plaintiff's mistake and hold him to performance at this
figure, especially since it had knowledge of his mistake when the bid was
accepted.
Very often this element of hardship to the plaintiff is stressed when
rescission is granted for an unilateral mistake of fact.
Mistake of Law
A mistake of law in California must be mutual to be the basis of rescis-
sion,34 or it must be known to one party that the other is laboring under
a mistake.3 5 In the latter case, the contract is voidable by rescission at the
instance of the mistaken party.36
There are at least two other exceptions to the general rule that a mis-
take of law must be mutual to entitle either mistaken party to rescission;
one is by statute, the other by judicial decision.
The statutory exception, Civil Code section 1579, classifies a mistake of
foreign law as a mistake of fact The other exception as indicated by dicta
in Rued v. Cooper, states that a mistake of a personal legal right is a mis-
take of fact.37 It is not altogether clear what the courts mean by a mistake
of a personal legal right. In Rued, it was a mistake as to plaintiff's right
to recover money he had advanced in a stock transaction.
The definition is tenuous, but often it is used to allow the rescission of
an inequitable contract which the plaintiff has entered into for the very
purpose of in some way affecting his private legal rights, but which he
misunderstands.
This exception to the general rule that a mistake of law must be mutual
to be rescindable is not automatically applied, but is applied on a case to
case basis when courts feel rescission is necessary, although the mistake of
law is unilateral. Writers such as Williston have long advocated the lessen-
ing of emphasis on whether a mistake is of fact or law, and making the
82d. at 436, 51 Pac. at 633.
3237 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P.2d 7 (1951).
34 E.g., Benson v. Bunting, 127 Cal. 532, 59 Pac. 991 (1900).
35 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1578.
36 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3406.
3 119 Cal. 463 at 468, 51 Pac. 704 at 705 (1897) (dictum).
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test for relief the equities of the individual case.As Nevertheless, the general
rule remains in California, that to rescind for a mistake of law, it must be
mutual.
Overlapping of Theories and Classifications
Occasionally, California courts have granted rescission on the theory of
mutual mistake without determining its classification as one of law or of
fact. In Hannah v. Steinman,39 for example, a lease was procured for the
purpose of building a wooden building. Unknown to either party, a newly
enacted San Francisco building ordinance prohibited the erection of wooden
buildings in the leased area. The court discussed mistake both of fact and
law, but granted rescission without deciding the exact basis.
Moreover, there are overlapping tendencies not only within the classi-
fications of relief, as shown in Hannah v. Steinman, but also between the
theories of relief-non-wilful misrepresentation or mistake. For example,
in Brown v. Klein,40 rescission of a partnership agreement was sought be-
cause of a misrepresentation as to the amount of indebtedness of the de-
fendant. Rescission was granted, but the court rested the decision on the
theory of mistake.
Comparison of Theories
Such overlapping reflects the similarities of the two theories of rescission,
but often leads to confusion. Therefore a comparison of the two is necessary.
As heretofore discussed, a non-wilful misrepresentation of fact as a
ground for rescission can be of three kinds: actual fraud, where statements
are unwarrantedly made; constructive fraud, where a legal relationship
between the parties was breached; and purely innocent misrepresentation,
where there was no legal relationship between the parties and the state-
ments made were warranted though untrue.
For a misrepresentation of law to be grounds for rescission, there must
have been some loosely-defined legal relationship between the parties, less
strict than that required for constructive fraud.
Under the theory of mistake, a mistake of fact justifying rescission can
be mutual, because the mistake is related to the extrinsic nature of the
bargain or because of an innocent misrepresentation, or unilateral where
the equitable considerations of hardship and unfairness become important.
Mistakes of law must be mutual to allow rescission with narrow excep-
tions: a mistake of a foreign law, mistake of one party known to be such by
the other party, or a mistake of a personal legal right.
Rescission is allowed for mutual mistake without classifying it as either
of law or fact, and the two basic theories are inextricably intertwined in
cases which label a non-wilful misrepresentation a mistake.
To facilitate the comparison, it is necessary to find a common term to
symbolize all three kinds of misrepresentation; i.e., 1. where misstatements
were innocently made but unwarrantedly and with an intent to induce a
38 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1589, n.8, at 4435 (rev. ed. 1937). See Cincinnati,
Indianapolis & W. Ry. v. Indianapolis Union Ry., 36 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1929), cert de-
nied, 281 U.S. 754 (1930); Peter v. Peter, 343 Il. 493, 175 N.E. 846, 75 A.L.R. 890
(1931).
39 159 Cal. 142, 112 Pac. 1094 (1911).
40 89 Cal. App. 153, 264 Pac. 496 (1928).
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contract; 2. where there may be no other element of responsibility than the
relationship between parties; and, 3. where a false statement was made
and relied on but where there was no special relationship between the
parties and the representation was warranted. The term honest misrepre-
sentation has been used to encompass all three, and because of the similarity
of result to cases of the traditional type, the term fraud has been suggested.
41
This latter classification is useful and will be used here, although it has
certain disadvantages because of the differences of degree within the defi-
nition itself.
The remedy of rescission whether based on the theory of mistake or on
this theory of "fraud" is basically equitable in nature. Important to both
theories is the policy that an innocent contractor should not be bound to
a contract which is under the circumstances unjust, merely to preserve a
profit to the other party. Equally important, though, is the idea that because
neither party has wilfully created the inequity, neither should have to suffer.
Consequently, an important element of each theory is the necessity' for
restoration of the adverse party to the statu quo. Whether the tender of
restoration must be made before the action for rescission, or restitution be
made as part of the relief gained, as by a conditional decree, restoration of
the statu quo ante is an essential requirement. Also, the effect of rescission
under either theory is the same-extinguishment of the contract.
4 2
But compatible and similar as these two basic theories of rescission are,
there are some differences. The most basic difference and yet the most dif-
ficult to specifically substantiate is the policy of the courts that whenever
there is a representation made which is in fact false, even though the state-
ment was made in the utmost good faith, there is a difference in the equities
of the parties. As the court said in Canadian Agency, Ltd. v. Assets Reali-
zation Co.,43 where rescission was sought because of an innocent misrepre-
sentation as to earnings of stock sold, ". . . [Wibile the court at Special
Term deemed this a case of mutual mistake (and it is such from one point
of view, since both parties were mistaken as to material facts affecting the
property sold) still it is something more than that."
44
Requirement of Materiality
This degree of difference between the theory of mistake and "fraud" is
reflected in many cases, sometimes almost imperceptibly. There is a greater
requirement of materiality when rescission is asked on the grounds of mis-
take than when the theory is "fraud." It is said that ". . . mistake, either of
law or fact, as grounds for rescission of a contract, must affect the execu-
tion and material elements of the contract and not merely some collateral
matter."4
5
415 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1540, at 4329 (rev. ed. 1937): "Fraud works legal
consequences because it induces mistake on the part of the person defrauded; and honest
misrepresentation when it produces legal consequences, does so for the same reason."
42 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1688.
43165 App. Div. 96, 150 N.Y. Supp. 758 (1914).
44 Id. at 102, 150 N.Y. Supp. at 762.
45 Bellwood Discount Corp. v. Empire Steel Bldg. Co., 175 Cal. App. 2d 432, 435,
346 P.2d 467, 470 (1959).
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This tendency toward strictness in mistake cases remains, even though
it is modified somewhat from the days of the landmark Michigan "cow
case," Sherwood v. Walker.4" In that case it was held that the mistake must
go to the whole substance of the agreement, so that the item must be sub-
stantially different from the one intended. More recently it was said, "...
[Tihe difference between the real and supposed quality must be so great,
so extreme, as to make it virtually a different thing." 7
Consequently, it is possible that a fact important enough to have actually
induced the contract, may be deemed a collateral issue and rescission be
denied if the theory advanced is mistake. Such was the case in Vickerson
v. Frey,48 where a building ordinance forbade utilization of all the apart-
ment house space as had been anticipated. If any representations had been
shown, as were allegedly made but not proved, it might have been possible
to obtain rescission under a theory of "fraud." The test of materiality for
"fraud" (misrepresentation) is less stringent; it is sufficient if it formed even
part of the inducement, but the representation must be relied upon.
49
Requirement of Injury
There is some difference in the requirement of injury in the two theories,
too. Previously, under either theory, the mistake or "fraud" must have caused
definite harm before an avoidance would lie. The Restatement of Contracts
states that without this harm a party can not avoid a contract on the basis
of mistake.50 And in the California case of Spreckles v. Gorrill, the court
stated that ".... fraud which has and will produce no injury will not justify
an action . . . for rescission."51 However, the court defined the requisite
injury as one which need not be measured in money, but which was suffi-
cient if it was pecuniary in nature.2 If the measure of injury adopted in
Earl v. Saks & C0. 3 was followed, the differences between the theories
would be even greater. In that case the California Supreme Court held
that ". . . anyone fraudulently induced to enter a contract is injured. His
interest in making a free choice and exercising his own best judgment...
has been interfered with."54 But this was a case of wilful misrepresentation,
and the definition of the injury necessary to obtain rescission because of the
non-wilful "fraud" in question here is limited to that of a tangible or pecu-
niary nature.55
These differences between the two theories stem from the implicit policy
determination that there is some degree of difference in the equities of the
parties under a theory of innocent "fraud" or misrepresentation in contrast
to the situation of parties seeking rescission because of a mistake.
46 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
47 Vickerson v. Frey, 100 Cal. App. 2d 621, 628, 224 P.2d 126, 130 (1950).
48 Id.
a9Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351, 23 Pac. 16 (1890); Rouse v. Morgan, 108 Cal.
App. 315, 291 Pac. 441 (1930).
50 RiESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 502, comment b (1932).
51 152 Cal. 383, 388, 92 Pac. 1011, 1014 (1907).
52 Id.
5336 Cal. 2d 602, 226 P.2d 340 (1951). See Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 309
(1951).
54 Supra note 53, at 611, 226 P.2d at 346.
65 Wainscott v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 98 Cal. 253, 33 Pac. 88 (1893).
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Differences Within "Fraud" Theory
It is important to note that there also are degrees of difference within
the theory of "fraud" itself. Rescission is more easily obtained with less
showing of injury when the ground complained of is actual fraud based on
statements unwarrantedly, though honestly, made to induce a contract as
in the Spreckles case, than it is in a case such as Rouse v. Morgan,56 where
the misrepresentations were held to be warranted, and there was no proof
that they were made to induce the contract. In the Rouse case rescission
was denied, although land had been sold by an absentee landowner appar-
ently in the belief (engendered by vendee) that his son had removed certain
buildings from the land. Relief might have been granted had the details
of the theory upon which rescission was sought been more clearly set out.
But as decided, the case demonstrates the demand for a greater showing of
injury and materiality when the ground complained of is this lesser degree
of "fraud," namely an innocent misrepresentation. In fact, in this last degree
of "fraud" the injury and materiality requirements are so similar to that
required for the theory of mistake, that Witkin equates the two and states
that California will grant rescission on the theory of mutual mistake even
in innocent misrepresentation situations.
57
Conclusion
Such overlapping is possible in many fact situations, but a summary
statement that the theories are interchangeable, would be incorrect. The
distinctions and differentiations between the degrees of the theory of "fraud,"
and the differences between that doctrine and the theory of rescission for
mistake, do exist, although they are often not obvious and frequently are
a matter of degree. In any case where rescission is desired and one or both
of these theories are pleaded, knowledge of the similarities and the differ-
ences will help avoid confusion and should expedite the attainment of relief.
loan G. Poulos*
50 108 Cal. App. 315, 291 Pac. 441 (1930).
.7 1 WrXIN, SumAY oF CALFoRNA LAw Contracts § 298 (7th ed. 1960).
*Member, Second Year class.
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